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Professional accounts of ECT:  A discourse analysis 
 
Abstract 
Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) is a socially contested psychiatric intervention.  However, 
the accounts of professionals involved in its use have rarely been systematically investigated.  
This study aimed to examine the accounts of clinicians who have used ECT on a routine 
basis.  Eight health professionals (psychiatrists, anaesthetists and psychiatric nurses) with 
experience of ECT administration were interviewed about the procedure.  Discourse 
Analysis was used to interpret the interview transcripts.  Interviewees appeared to draw on a 
repertoire which constructed ECT recipients as severely ill.  This was used to support claims 
which had the effect of: defining who should receive ECT; warranting the use of urgent 
physical psychiatric treatments; reformulating distress in biological terms; and discounting 
the therapeutic value of alternative, non-physical interventions.  The interviewees managed 
concerns about ECT in a variety of ways, for example by: rendering it as a medical 
procedure with concomitant risks and benefits; downplaying a lack of clarity over its 
evidence base; and undermining the legitimacy of criticisms.  Implications of these findings 
are discussed. 
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 Introduction 
Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) remains one of the most widely used but contested and 
debated interventions in psychiatry.  Advocates argue that the procedure is safe, effective 
and often life-saving (e.g. Abrams, 1997; Fink, 1979) whilst critics argue that it is ineffective 
and has the potential to cause psychological and neurological harm (e.g. Breggin, 1993; 
Friedberg, 1977; Johnstone, 2000, 2003; Read, 2004).   
 
However, there are two neglected areas in the research literature.  The first is the relative 
lack of interest in the experiences of ECT recipients.  Recently, researchers, including those 
with direct personal experience of receiving ECT have tried to redress this imbalance 
(Johnstone, 1999; Rose, Wykes, Leese, Bindman & Fleischmann, 2003; Rose, Fleischmann 
& Wykes, 2004) and there is a need for further investigation in this area.   
 
A second neglected area is the empirical investigation of the accounts of those involved in 
ECT administration.  The two most popular investigatory paradigms here have been 
psychoanalytic and cognitive.  We will briefly review studies from these two paradigms, 
arguing that these studies are both theoretically and methodologically limited, before making 
the case for the contribution of a discursive approach.   
 
The unconscious motives of professionals:  Psychoanalytic research  
In the two decades following the introduction of ECT in the late 1930s, a variety of theories 
emerged to explain how 'shock treatments' worked and affected patients -- Gordon (1948) for 
example, reviews 50 of these. Less frequently, theorists examined the way ECT affected the 
professionals involved in its administration (e.g. Abse & Ewing, 1956; Fenichel, 1945; 
Wayne, 1955). Both were characterised by a psychoanalytic approach.  
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 Abse and Ewing (1956) analysed ‘off guard’ statements made by psychiatrists who were 
experienced in administering 'shock treatments'. They suggested that such accounts were 
characterised by themes of hostility and punishment. For example, ‘lets see if a few shocks 
will knock him out of it’; ‘why don’t you put him on the assembly line’; and the description 
of ECT as ‘a mental spanking’ (all p. 37). The authors suggested that ‘the very nature of the 
treatment itself can produce the attitudes described’ (p.38).  
 
In a more recent example, Levenson and Willett (1982) reported observing ‘splitting’ 
(divided clinical opinions), and disruption to the ‘therapeutic alliance’ (rapport and empathy) 
in a multidisciplinary team involved in the care of two patients who received ECT. They 
concluded that ECT was an upsetting procedure because it ‘often produces rapid 
improvement in patients who had previously not responded to treatment’ (p.298) and the 
staff team experienced the therapeutic success as ‘implying devaluation of their own 
therapeutic skills’ (p.302).    
 
However, this paradigm suffers from a number of limitations.  For example, these studies 
have tended to be based on anecdotal reports rather than a more systematic gathering of 
material.  Moreover, the reported comments are open to a number of competing 
explanations.  Since psychoanalytic interpretations rely for their plausibility on inferred 
constructs which lie, as it were, within the person's unconscious and thus cannot be 
demonstrated in the texts, they remain largely speculative. 
 
From motives to attitudes, belief and knowledge:  cognitive research 
The second dominant approach in this area is cognitive, with questionnaires as the primary 
methodology. There have been a number of questionnaire-based studies investigating the 
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attitudes and knowledge of professionals who are involved with ECT (e.g. Finch, Sobin, 
Carmody, deWitt & Shiwach, 1999; Janicak, Mask, Trimakas & Gibbons, 1985; Kalayam & 
Steinhart, 1981; Lutchman, Stevens, Bashir & Orrell, 2001).  Janicak et al., (1985) compared 
the knowledge and attitudes of psychiatrists, nurses, psychologists and social workers in 
relation to ECT. They reported that a positive attitude towards ECT in professional groups 
was correlated with increased knowledge about the procedure and they concluded that 
educating staff about the facts of ECT would increase its utilisation in conditions where they 
suggested it should be the treatment of choice. Lutchman et al., (2001) used a similar design 
and drew similar conclusions finding differences in attitudes and knowledge across different 
disciplines with psychiatrists being the most positive about ECT and psychologists the least. 
 
However, as Diana Rose and her colleagues (Rose et al., 2003, 2004) have argued in relation 
to investigations of ECT recipients' experiences, questionnaire-based methods limit and 
reduce the responses available to participants (see also Rosier, 1974).  As a result, the 
possibility that factors other than knowledge might correspond with attitudes towards ECT 
has remained unexplored. More importantly, perhaps, this paradigm is methodologically and 
conceptually limited as a result of its assumptions about what constitutes 'knowledge' and 
'attitudes' which are, again, inferred constructs thought to lie within the individual's head.   
 
A more fundamental problem with this approach is the way in which knowledge about ECT 
is presented as uncontested fact when the reality is much more complicated.  Both the 
Janicak et al., (1985) and Lutchman et al., (2001) studies asked participants whether they 
agreed or disagreed with statements about the procedure. Despite being presented as 
‘factually correct’ or ‘factually incorrect’ each statement could be interpreted in different 
ways and their facticity has been disputed in the literature.  For example, the first statement 
from Janicak et al., (1985) -- ‘the therapeutic effect of ECT is related to the induction of a 
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seizure in the brain’ is both supported (West, 1981) and contradicted by research 
demonstrating the effectiveness of placebo ECT (see Medical Research Council, 1965).  
 
Similar assumptions have been made about ‘attitudes’ towards ECT.  Janicak et al.’s (1985) 
participants were asked whether they would have ECT themselves if they were ‘suffering 
from varying degrees of depression’ (p.263) and these responses were then regarded as 
demonstrating positive or negative attitudes toward the procedure. However, as with most 
attitude research there are fundamental epistemological difficulties with the notion that 
responses to lists of statements are unproblematically transformed into inferred mental 
constructs like beliefs or attitudes or unproblematically linked with conduct.  Discursive 
psychologists like Potter and Wetherell (1987) dispute the idea that completing an attitude 
questionnaire represents a neutral and transparent transfer of an internal cognitive state to a 
mark on a page. Instead, they argue that people construct what they say in order to serve a 
range of functions (though not necessarily intentionally) and that this can be seen in intra- 
and inter-participant response variation.  Thus the meaning of a psychiatrist agreeing with 
the statement that they would undergo the procedure if they were depressed (as 76.6 % of 
Janicak et al.'s participants did) is not straightforward.  For example, such agreement might 
enable participants to counter the potential charge of ethical inconsistency which might 
accompany disagreement with the statement.  Moreover, the statement is abstracted from a 
context – there might conceivably be situations where these participants would be less likely 
to agree to have ECT.   
 
From motives, knowledge and attitudes to accounts:  The contribution of a discursive 
approach 
Variation, disagreement and contradiction are usually rigorously controlled for in traditional 
cognitive research but at the cost of focusing on attitudes shorn of their context and this may 
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tell us little about situated attitudes.  In contrast, such variation is a topic of analytic 
importance for discourse analysts. For example, Harper (1999), in his study of professional 
and service user accounts of psychiatric medication, reported that a variety of explanations 
could be used in order to account for events such as the apparent failure of medication.  
Moreover, these explanations could be seen as having a variety of rhetorical effects – in 
other words, they served a persuasive function, though this was not necessarily seen as an 
intentional action on the part of speakers. For example, when speakers claimed that 
medication had not worked because of the chronicity of the service user’s ‘illness’, this 
emphasised the permanence and severity of biological symptoms and shifted responsibility 
for treatment failure away from the medication and on to the illness.  
 
Discourse analysis (DA) has been used to explore the accounts of health professionals in 
relation to a number of topics (Griffiths & Hughes, 2000; Parker et al., 1995; Soyland, 
1995).  Because of its focus on the inherent variability of accounts it is particularly useful in 
understanding how contested issues are constructed by participants.  For example, Horton-
Salway (2002) has shown how General Practitioner's discussions about ME are often 
concerned with the management of blame for the condition. Boyle (2002, 2004) has 
suggested that professionals' use of rhetorical resources can make some ways of talking 
about a topic like schizophrenia seem more reasonable than others.   In his study of talk 
about medication, for example, Harper (1999) argued that one of the effects of such talk was 
to serve certain institutional interests -- for example, accounting for medication failure as due 
to the chronicity of illness could be seen to serve the interests of the ‘psychopharmaceutical 
complex’ (Breggin, 1993) because questions about the efficacy of medication were deflected 
when such responses were deployed.   
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Johnstone and Frith (2005) have recently used DA to examine Freeman and Kendall’s 
(1980) study of ECT recipients’ experiences and attitudes.  They describe how patients are 
rhetorically constructed in this article in a number of ways, for example as passive and 
compliant or as hostile and unreasonable.  They note that one of the effects of such 
constructions is to 'preserve the view of ECT as a benign and beneficial procedure, and to 
validate both psychiatrists and psychiatry in the continued use of this treatment' (p.200). 
 
DA thus provides a novel perspective on the accounts of professionals.  However, the kind 
of accounts presented in published research articles are highly systematised and organised 
and are likely to differ from those found in more informal settings.  The aim of the present 
study, therefore, was to conduct an empirical qualitative investigation of accounts of the 
administration of ECT by those who administer it in the more informal context setting of a 
semi-structured interview.   
 
Method 
Eight clinicians involved in administering ECT were interviewed about it by the first author.  
The interview transcripts were interpreted using Discourse Analysis which draws on a 
broadly social constructionist epistemology.  Here we will briefly note key discourse 
analytic concepts on which we drew in the present study.  Following Wetherell's (1998) 
suggestion, we have drawn on both discursive psychology and Foucauldian discourse 
analytic traditions (Willig, 2001).  
 
In discursive psychology, the systematic ways of talking about a topic generally found in 
conversations, are termed interpretative repertoires.   Edwards and Potter (1992) have 
described a number of ways in which speakers use rhetorical devices which have the effect 
of making what they are saying appear factual -- an example is the empiricist forms of 
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accounting found in journal articles, where the agency of the scientist is minimised and 
agency is implicitly located in the objects of research.  Such devices are often deployed 
when there is some disagreement about the facts and when the speaker has a stake in the 
outcome.   
 
The analysis also drew on positioning theory (Davies & Harré, 1990), which attempts to re-
conceptualise static and essentialist notions like role and identity.  It assumes that when 
people speak they implicitly position themselves and others in relation to the topic under 
discussion.  For example, in a conversation between a doctor and a patient, the doctor is 
implicitly assumed to have expertise about topics like illness, diagnosis and so on, whilst the 
patient is implicitly assumed to have expertise about topics like their health concerns.  Parker 
(1997) notes that all positions carry ‘certain rights to speak and specifications for what may 
be spoken’ (p.291).  Thus there are certain things which can and cannot be said from 
particular positions and within particular interpretative repertoires.    
 
Discourse analysts try to avoid the ascription of intentionality to participants’ accounts.  In 
other words, it is not assumed that participants strategically design their talk in order to have 
certain effects.  Parker (1992) comments that ‘people make discourse, but not in discursive 
conditions of their choosing' (p. 32).  One significant context-marker for the present study is 
that the participants were being interviewed by a psychologist who, by virtue of his 
discipline (see Lutchman et al., 2001) might be thought to have a different position to them 
on ECT and this may well have influenced the results.  Walkup (1994) has argued, for 
example, that such situations may well lead to 'quite self-conscious attention to legitimation 
themes' (p.149).  The reader needs to take this into account in judging the quality of the 
analysis. 
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Participants 
All the interviews took place in a major city in the United Kingdom.  The interviewees 
represented the cross-professional involvement in ECT administration, including pre- and 
post-procedure care (psychiatric nurses), prescription and delivery of the treatment 
(psychiatrists) and the administration of anaesthetic and muscle relaxant (anaesthetists). The 
research aim was to identify which positions and repertoires were culturally available to the 
speakers – in other words to see what range of things could be said about ECT by 
professionals.  Since discourse analysts are critical of abstract notions like ‘attitude’ and 
‘view’, the aim was not to represent participants’ views nor to compare views within the 
sample.  
 
We considered that eight participants would produce a reasonable range of possible 
repertoires and positions and this is consistent with previous DA research.  A purposive 
sampling strategy was followed in that a range of disciplines were interviewed:  four 
psychiatrists; two psychiatric in-patient nurses; and two anaesthetists. More psychiatrists 
were interviewed since ECT is primarily a psychiatric intervention.   
 
Potential participants were identified and recruited through liaison with departments of 
anaesthetics or old age psychiatry  -- the latter departments prescribe a substantial portion of 
the total number of ECT administrations in the UK (Pippard & Ellam, 1981). All were sent a 
standard invitation letter followed by a telephone call.  The first eight professionals invited 
to take part agreed to do so.  
 
The small number of participants increases the risk that they will be identified and so, in 
order to protect confidentiality, we will present demographic information for the group as a 
whole and not for individuals.  Four men and four women were interviewed.  Three 
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participants were aged in their 30s, three in their 40s and two in their 50s. Five of the six 
medical professionals were consultants and one was a senior registrar. The two nurse 
participants had considerable involvement with ECT.  All but one participant was involved 
with ECT administration at the time of the interviews. 
 
Interviews 
Potter and Hepburn (2005) have cautioned against what they see as the inappropriate and 
over-use of interview methods in DA studies.  It is certainly true that interviews create 
particular kinds of interaction and they should not be seen as a proxy for more 'naturally 
occurring' kinds of conversations.  However, it seemed that interviews were an appropriate 
source of data here because the study was interested in how professionals constructed 
accounts about ECT, for example how they might provide justifications for a contested 
intervention.  
 
Interviews took place at a time and place of participants’ choosing, usually at their 
workplace. The aims of the investigation were explained, anonymity was guaranteed and 
consent to both audio-taping the interviews and publishing extracts was obtained. A semi-
structured interview schedule was followed, covering the participants’ experiences of ECT 
and issues that had been debated within the literature.  Appropriate ethical permission had 
previously been granted from a University Ethics Committee and interviews were conducted 
in 2001. 
 
Initial reading and coding 
Following Wood and Kroger’s (2000) guidelines, all the transcripts were read through in 
their entirety while a separate list of recurring or interesting categories and features were 
noted and eventually categorised. Extracts seen as related to each category were copied and 
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pasted into correspondingly named computer topic files. Once printed, these became the 
material for analysis.  
 
Results 
Discourse analysts see their interpretation of such texts as only one of a number of possible 
readings and not the definitive one (Willig, 2001).  Our reading of the interview transcripts 
indicated that different interpretative repertoires and rhetorical devices were drawn on by the 
interviewees, suggesting that a range of such features were culturally available to them. 
During the reading, the subject of interest was talk about ECT and, increasingly, as the 
analysis progressed, about those to whom it was administered. Although a range of features 
were identified, because of limitations of space, our analysis is structured by a focus on the 
‘biomedical-medical’ interpretative repertoire and the 'severe end' rhetorical device.  We will 
also discuss how interviewees managed concerns about ECT.  We will also draw on some of 
the psychiatric literature in order to place the interview material in context. 
 
Transcription notation is described in the appendix.  The code underneath each extract refers 
to the participant (e.g. Dr A), their discipline (e.g. consultant psychiatrist) and the line 
numbers of the interview transcript from which the extract derives (e.g. lines 20-22). 
 
The biomedical-medical repertoire   
Throughout the interviews, it was common for ECT recipients to be described with 
diagnostic medical language, which typically referred to their behaviour and the 
consequences of that behaviour. For example, asked who was most likely to receive ECT, Dr 
A responded ‘patients with severe depression who may be in a depressive stupor – that 
means that they’re sort of bed-bound, immobile, not eating not drinking’ (Dr A, consultant 
psychiatrist: lines 54-55). Such lists of behaviour were described elsewhere as ‘clear 
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biological features’ (Dr E, consultant psychiatrist: lines 753-754) or ‘prominent physical 
symptoms’ (Dr B, senior psychiatric registrar: line 117).  
 
A variant of the biomedical-medical conceptualisation of patient behaviour and psychiatric 
interventions were accounts framed in electro-chemical terms.  These are also to be found in 
some of the professional literature, for example, ‘repeated treatments [of ECT] alter 
chemical messages in the brain and bring them back to normal’ (Royal College of 
Psychiatrists, 1995, p.104).    
 
The biomedical-medical repertoire was often accompanied by a rhetorical device which 
focused on the chronicity and severity of problems.    
 
The ‘severe end’ rhetorical device 
In the following extract the characteristics of those who are seen as most likely to be 
appropriate for treatment with ECT are discussed.  Dr A is discussing the occasions when 
ECT might be used to save life:  
 
 
 Dr A:  They’re sort of bed bound, immobile, not eating, not 
drinking, er at risk of developing um major medical problems such 
as deep vein thrombosis, pulmonary embelomic complications, 
which will kill them.  
 
Interviewer:  Right. Is that as a result of er (.)  
 
 13
Dr A:  Depression. Because they’re severely depressed, they’re in a 
depressive stupor. It’s defined as stuporose, literally.  
 
    (Dr A, consultant psychiatrist: lines 54-60) 
 
Who is appropriate for ECT? 
One feature of the extract is the way in which Dr A constructs those patients who are seen as 
appropriate for ECT.   They are ‘bed bound, immobile, not eating, not drinking’ – and 
located at what another interviewee described as ‘the severe end’ of the clinical spectrum (Dr 
E, consultant psychiatrist:  line 56).  Examples of the use of the ‘severe end’ device can also 
be found in the professional literature: 
 
 It is recommended that electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) is used only to achieve rapid 
 and short-term improvement of severe symptoms after an adequate trial of other 
 treatment options has proven ineffective and/or when the condition is considered to 
 be potentially life-threatening, in individuals with: severe depressive illness; 
 catatonia; a prolonged or severe manic episode. 
     (National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2003, p.1) 
 
ECT as ‘life-saving’ 
A formulation of ECT recipients as ‘severe’ appeared to warrant the use of ECT on 
occasions when the person was viewed as at risk of dying either because of their attempts to 
actively kill themselves or because they were not eating or drinking.  Both these kinds of 
behaviour were seen as symptoms of depression with failure to eat or drink viewed more 
seriously if the person was older, thereby potentially increasing the risk of physical health 
complications.  The claim that ECT was life-saving was common across the interviews, 
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regardless of participants’ professional orientation.  One effect of the ‘life-saving’ repertoire 
was to sanction the use of ECT under conditions of compulsory psychiatric treatment (i.e. 
without requiring recipients' consent).  This was termed ‘emergency ECT’ by participants.  
The grounds for such treatment are highly contested:  both Johnstone (2003) and Read 
(2004) argue that there are no studies to support the claims of advocates for ‘emergency 
ECT’.  Read comments that ECT ‘does not prevent suicide and for a small number may 
precipitate it’ (2004, p.95). 
 
Locating the focus of concern at the biological level 
Another feature of interest in Dr A’s extract is that there appears to be a causal chain in the 
location of the cause of problems.  Causal agency initially appears to be located in physical 
health problems but these are then framed as caused by the patients’ self-destructive 
behaviour, which in turn is seen as caused by depression. Ultimately, these biological signs 
and symptoms are presented as the threat to life. One effect of using technical descriptions 
(‘pulmonary embelomic complications’) is to construct the patient as both the cause of, and 
passive victim of, biological processes.   
 
A second effect of constructing the problem at the biomedical-medical level, rather than, say 
the psychological, or societal, is that it then becomes difficult to argue for alternative, 
especially non-biomedical, explanations and interventions.  ECT was thus constructed not 
only as a reasonable intervention, but also an obvious one because it was viewed as fast-
working and effective.   One effect of this was that non-physical interventions were often 
discounted. 
 
 15
Exclusion of non-physical interventions 
In the following extract, a participant describes the importance of early treatment when 
service users are extremely 'ill': 
 
Dr E:  … if you delay effective treatment, you often have a tougher fight to fight. 
(Dr E, consultant psychiatrist: lines 789-709) 
 
In this extract ‘treatment’ is implicitly seen as synonymous with ECT and the notion of time 
is foregrounded.  It is implied that the use of other interventions would mean delaying the 
use of ECT which is constructed as an 'effective treatment'.  Elsewhere in the interviews the 
term 'treatment' was seen as synonymous with pharmaceutical interventions.  The ECT fact 
sheet for patients published by the UK's Royal College of Psychiatrists (Royal College of 
Psychiatrists, 1995) states, ‘the alternative [to ECT] is drug therapy which also has risks and 
complications’ (p.104).  Non-physical interventions such as psychotherapy or increased 
social support are absenced in these accounts and one effect of this is to preclude them from 
being offered as alternative interventions. Arscott (1999) points out, ‘it is likely to be 
difficult for a patient to refuse treatment with ECT if they believe that this is their only 
chance of cure’ (p.106).     
 
Managing concern about ECT 
All of the interviewees recognised that there was public concern about ECT and that it was 
seen as controversial and they managed this in a number of ways.  They acknowledged 
grounds for concern but framed ECT within a risks and benefits calculus similar to other 
medical procedures, sometimes accompanying this with claims that the evidential basis was 
becoming clearer.  The interviewees acknowledged criticisms of ECT but in some of their 
accounts, more rights to speak were accorded to service user critics who had undergone it.   
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 Dr E:  And I’m actually quite scrupulous about g-, giving the pros and cons 
<Interviewer:  yeah> I, I, I very often clear with people, I really think this is the 
treatment you should be having, but I’m also very clear ab-, that many people don’t 
agree with this treatment, it’s still regarded as controversial, there are some things 
you probably will experience which you will not like. You probably will find your 
memory’s adversely affected. Er there are, you know, having an anaesthetic is at, at 
some level a risk, oh, the figure that’s quoted in the College of Psychiatrists 
Handbook is three deaths per one hundred thousand anaesthetics. 
(Dr E, consultant psychiatrist: lines 193-202) 
 
Acknowledging grounds for concern:  Weighing up risks and benefits 
One way in which concern about ECT was managed was by drawing on a notion of informed 
consent.  In this extract Dr E notes how ECT recipients are presented with ‘the pros and 
cons’.  He includes some of the key concerns which critics of ECT have raised:  that many 
disagree with it; that memory problems may occur; and that the administration of the 
anaesthetic itself is a risk.  However, at the same time Dr E says that he states ‘I really think 
this is the treatment you should be having’.  Also, the risk from the anaesthetic is slightly 
downplayed by noting that it is a risk ‘at some level’, although for the anaesthetist 
participants, the risk from anaesthesia was seen as raising the most concern.  This informed 
consent account is commonly encountered in discussions about medical procedures like 
major surgery and so one effect of employing such a risk and benefits calculus is that ECT 
was seen as similar to other medical procedures. 
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Rendering ECT as a medical procedure 
Within the interviews, ECT was often discussed through analogies with effects or processes 
associated with general medical procedures and this also had an effect of managing concern 
about ECT.  If ECT can be seen as a medical procedure with concomitant risks and benefits 
then its particularly controversial status within the popular imagination (e.g. from films like 
One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest) can be minimised. Differences between the work of 
psychiatrists administering ECT and that of their medical colleagues carrying out surgery are 
de-emphasised and the procedure is presented as reasonable – as Johnstone and Frith (2005) 
put it, ECT is thus presented as a ‘benign and beneficial procedure’ (p.200). Pilgrim and 
Rogers (1993) have argued that linking the content of psychiatric procedures with those of 
other medical procedures is one way of increasing the institutional alignment between 
psychiatry and general medicine -- an enterprise which Baruch and Treacher (1978) have 
suggested began in the 1960s when psychiatrists shifted their site of operation from separate 
institutions to district general hospitals. Equating the physical processes involved in 
psychiatric treatment with those involved in general medical treatment allows the status of 
the problem to be more easily conceptualised as biomedical-medical. Moreover, Bracken 
and Thomas (2001) note that attempts to assert the equivalence of psychiatric and medical 
illness ignores the power of psychiatrists to use psychiatric treatments coercively. They 
remark, ‘patients and the public know that a diagnosis of diabetes, unlike one of 
schizophrenia cannot result in their being forcibly detained in hospital’ (p. 725) and note, ‘it 
is hard to imagine the emergence of ‘anti-paediatrics’ or ‘critical anaesthetics’ movements’ 
(Bracken & Thomas, 2001, p.724). 
 
Downplaying debate:  The evidence is becoming clearer 
A common theme in many psychiatric accounts of contested treatments is that the grounds 
for debate are lessening with increased research (see, for example Clare, 1976).  This was 
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evidenced in the interview material.   In the transcript just before the next extract, Dr B had 
noted that patient concerns about the lack of knowledge about how ECT works was 
understandable. 
 
Dr B:  If the case for ECT was (.) crystal clear, that it does definitely work, then that 
wouldn’t happen. (.) But as it happens, the case is not crystal clear, but I think it’s 
clearing up. 
(Dr B, senior psychiatric registrar: lines 447-449) 
 
Here Dr B acknowledges that the case for ECT is ‘not crystal clear’.  Left at this point, Dr B 
could potentially be challenged on why he continues to prescribe ECT.  However, he then 
goes on to claim that it is ‘clearing up’.  This could be seen as a form of ‘rhetorical 
inoculation' (Sorenson, 1991) where a speaker deflects anticipated criticism.   
 
In addition to these ways in which ECT recipients’ concerns were managed within the 
interviews, the interviewees also drew on a range of other responses to direct challenges 
from ECT critics including groups of patients who have received ECT. 
 
Managing criticism of ECT:  Who has rights to speak? 
In the following extract, a participant discusses the confusion which they suggest can be 
experienced by patients and relatives regarding the behaviour of service users after they have 
received ECT.  Dr B is discussing the case of a patient who had ‘lost her memory of her 
holidays’ (line 89): 
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Dr B:  ECT is given to people who are very ill. And it’s very easy for relatives and 
patients (.) to (.) mix the two, sort of to (.) blame (.) ECT, the ECT for things that are 
to do with the illness. 
(Dr B, senior psychiatric registrar: lines 93-95)  
 
Here Dr B suggests that behaviour could be viewed both as the direct result of ECT or, 
instead, ‘to do with the illness’.   In claiming that it is due to the latter, Dr B draws on the 
‘severe end’ device by describing those receiving ECT as 'very ill’.  If this statement was 
made by a non-professional, it might be seen simply as an assertion.  However, discourse 
analysts note that the force of a statement comes not only from its content but who makes it.  
Edwards and Potter (1992) describe the 'category entitlement' device which refers to the way 
in which the veracity of a report can be warranted by the entitlement of a speaker in a 
particular category to know certain things or have certain skills. Dr B’s professional status 
confers rights to speak about what might constitute both unwanted effects of ECT and 
symptoms of illness. Others, like the relatives and patients mentioned here are positioned as 
less informed about the medical understanding of emotional distress and the effects of 
treatment.  Thus it becomes possible to construct them as less authorised to make such 
judgements.  One effect of this is to undermine the legitimacy of criticisms made by non-
experts and especially recipients of ECT and their relatives.  Johnstone and Frith (2005) have 
noted similar strategies at work in their DA of Freeman and Kendall's (1980) article. 
 
Of course, service users can attempt to claim certain kinds of category entitlements.  As 
recipients of ECT they might understandably argue that they had expertise in understanding 
the effects of ECT.  Indeed, such arguments have enabled users’ experiences of ECT to gain 
a foothold in research conducted by ECT recipients themselves (Rose et al., 2003, 2004).  
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However, in the next extract, we see how attempts to gain such rights to speak can be 
challenged: 
 
 
Interviewer: What, and when you talk about er (.)  lay views of depression, <Dr F – 
yeah> many people underestimate how profoundly depressed people can be, what, 
what is the lay view of depression do you think? What is the standard view? 
 
Dr F:  Well, I, it could be people who don’t feel like going to work, who don’t feel 
like going out, who don’t feel like getting out of bed in the morning (.) er and they’re 
a bit low (.) er it’s really, they stop socialising. I don’t think people realise that 
depression is also, you stop eating, (.) that you’ve stopped having baths, that you 
don’t have a bath for three months and they find you at home. You know, that’s what 
they don’t realise. You know, because as I said, most people have felt a bit low, but 
they don’t really realise that depression is a serious illness. I don’t know if you’re a 
patient. Did, did you talk to the patient groups? 
 
Interviewer:  Well I’ve read some of their literature.  
 
Dr F: I don’t know, do they really know how bad these people are (.) those, those 
who are against ECT? (.) Do they ever come across, them, do they ever see how bad 
they are, do they/ 
 
Interviewer:  /Do you mean people in the anti-ECT groups? 
 
Dr F:  That’s right, do they really see them? You see it’s so easy for 
them to say when they get better ‘oh ECT is a cruel treatment’, but do 
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they remember how bad they were to start with? Do they really know 
how severely ill? 
(Dr F, consultant anaesthetist: lines 342-364).  
 
Dr F’s account here follows a similar trajectory to that of the previous extract from Dr B in 
that lay views of depression are challenged: ‘they don’t really realise that depression is a 
serious illness’.  In this extract, the ‘severe end’ device is drawn on by describing 'how bad' 
and how 'severely ill' patients can be before they have ECT.  However, Dr F goes on to use a 
similar formulation to challenge the legitimacy of accounts of ‘patient groups’.  These 
critical accounts are implicitly challenged for being selective or lacking in objectivity in 
some way: ‘do they really see them?’. 
 
There is an interesting shift in this extract, from describing individuals who are against ECT, 
but who have not ‘come across’ those who receive it, to describing those who have received 
it (‘patient groups’), but who are ‘better’ and might have forgotten ‘how bad they were to 
start with’. This account appears to challenge the legitimacy of the criticisms of both groups 
by drawing on the implied category entitlement of ‘doctor’ which is set against the category 
entitlement of ‘patient’. Thus, the knowledge and claims of ECT recipients who have 
experienced adverse effects are positioned as secondary to the knowledge and claims of the 
professionals who administer the procedure. These service users are positioned as poorly 
informed and forgetful.  However, those who are critical of the procedure, but who have not 
been recipients, are implicitly positioned as even less authorised to criticise ECT. Elsewhere 
this is put more explicitly:  
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Nurse A:  And especially if the person is really anti-ECT and had ECT then I haven’t 
got too much of a problem. (.) It’s the ones that haven’t had ECT that are against it 
that I’ve got a bit of a problem with. 
(Nurse A, Psychiatric Nurse: lines 364-367) 
 
By singling out those who are critical but who ‘haven’t had ECT’, Nurse A’s account 
appears to imply a hierarchy of authority to speak about ECT with those who have received 
ECT seen as having more rights to speak than those who have not.  However, as we have 
seen, even those service users who have received ECT can still have the validity of their 
views challenged.  
 
Discussion 
We have presented a reading of professionals’ accounts of ECT in which interviewees 
appeared to draw on a repertoire which constructed ECT recipients as severely ill.  This was 
used to support claims which: circumscribed who should receive ECT; warranted the use of 
urgent physical psychiatric treatments; reformulated distress in biological terms; and 
discounted the therapeutic value of alternative, non-physical treatments.  The interviewees 
managed concerns about ECT by: rendering it as a medical procedure with concomitant risks 
and benefits; downplaying a lack of clarity over its evidence base; and undermining the 
legitimacy of criticisms.  
 
The use of the ‘severe end’ rhetorical device is interesting in the light of evidence that the 
strongest predictor of ECT prescription is gender and age, rather than severity of illness:  
women and those aged over 65 (again, predominantly women for demographic reasons) are 
most likely to receive ECT (Read, 2004; Salford Community Health Council, 1998).  
Moreover, the viewing of memory problems as resulting from depression rather than ECT 
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seems a little dated – the consensus view from a range of studies does appear to demonstrate 
a range of cognitive problems following ECT administration (McElhiney, Moody, Steif, 
Prudic, Devanand, Nobler & Sackheim, 1995; Neylan, Canick, Hall, Reus, Sapolsky & 
Wolkowitz, 2001; Robertson & Pryor, 2006).   
 
In interviewees’ accounts, the agency of psychiatrists in prescribing ECT was downplayed 
with the decision portrayed as flowing from factors relating to the severity of illness.  
However, this does not account for the variability of ECT prescription over time, in different 
regions and also between psychiatrists.   For example, the study of ECT prescription in 
Salford and Greater Manchester (Salford Community Health Council, 1998) detailed wide 
variations both between individual psychiatrists and over time.  In his analysis of discourse 
concerning paranoid delusions, Harper (1994) reported that professionals used empiricist 
forms of accounting to explain how they reached diagnoses but he noted that they drew on a 
more contingent and subjective form of accounting to explain variations in diagnoses 
between professionals.  This could be explored in further research focused on professionals’ 
accounts. 
 
 
Implications 
 
There are epistemological challenges associated with applying findings from discourse 
analytic research (Willig, 1999).  However, some discourse analysts explicitly seek to 
promote ‘subversive discursive practices and spaces of resistance’ (Willig, 1999: p. 12).  
Here we will suggest some implications consistent with our analysis for different interest 
groups in mental health:  researchers, professionals and service users. 
 
 
Researchers 
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Discourse analysis can provide a useful way both of examining some of the assumptions 
implicit in professional accounts and of detailing their effects.  This can be most useful in 
relation to topics like mental health where conceptualisations are contested.  Future research 
could explore whether the strategies employed here can be seen in other accounts both of 
ECT and of other psychiatric interventions.  However, there is also a need for further 
research into the experiences of the recipients of psychiatric interventions, including studies 
conducted by service user researchers.   
 
Mental health professionals 
It may be possible to draw on some of the insights of studies like this to develop training 
packages to help mental health professionals become aware of the ways in which particular 
rhetorical resources may foreclose the offering of choices about interventions, like ECT, to 
service users.  Such training could be aimed not only at psychiatrists, but also other health 
professionals (e.g. psychiatric nurses and social workers, psychologists and anaesthetists 
etc). 
 
It is important to note that ECT recipients, like other users of mental health services, are not 
a homogeneous group of individuals (see Campbell, 1999). For example, some (e.g. ECT 
Anonymous, 1999a) have called for ECT to be banned, whilst others (e.g. Perkins, 1994) 
have made a case for its benefits.   Service users could be provided with specific information 
about the type of accounts which they might expect prescribing clinicians to draw on during 
discussions about ECT.  Robertson and Pryor (2006) have provided a useful format for 
discussing the benefits and risks associated with ECT with mental health service users.  
Informing service users about the ways in which health professionals can use language to 
construct ECT as ‘ordinary' or 'urgent', and patients as ‘severely ill’ for example, could allow 
them to recognise that this is only one possible way of understanding their situation. Simply 
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knowing that other accounts are available could empower service users to ask more 
questions about ECT and alternative treatments.  
 
Service users 
Service users could also develop training packages -- similar to assertiveness training – in 
managing psychiatric interviews by role-playing possible responses. Such training would 
need to be accessible and acknowledge both the emotional distress experienced by potential 
ECT recipients and the difficulties associated with challenging professional power.  An 
example of what such training might look like can be seen in the ECT Anonymous (1999b) 
factsheet which pre-empts a list of questions and suggests possible responses with the 
suggestion that ‘there are simple answers to all these queries, even ones with technical terms. 
If there is a deep reluctance to answer these questions you should suspect the likely quality 
of your treatment’ (p.1). 
 
 
 26
References 
 
Abrams, R. (1997) Electroconvulsive therapy.  Third edition. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Abse, D.W. & Ewing, J.A. (1956). Transference and countertransference in somatic 
therapies.  Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases, 123, 32-40. 
 
Arscott, (1999). ECT: The facts psychiatry declines to mention. In C. Newnes, G. Holmes & 
C. Dunn (Eds.), This is madness: A critical look at psychiatry and the future of mental health 
services (pp. 97-118). Ross on Wye: PCCS Books. 
 
Baruch, G. & Treacher, A. (1978). Psychiatry observed. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.  
 
Boyle, M. (2002).  Schizophrenia:  A scientific delusion?  Second edition.  London:  
Routledge.  
 
Boyle, M. (2004).  Preventing a non-existent illness?:  Some issues in the prevention of 
'schizophrenia'.  Journal of Primary Prevention, 24, 445-469. 
 
Bracken, P. and Thomas, P. (2001). Postpsychiatry: A new direction for mental health. 
British Medical Journal, 322, 724-727. 
 
Breggin, P.R. (1993). Toxic psychiatry. Drugs and electroconvulsive therapy: The truth and 
the better alternatives. London: HarperCollins. 
 
 27
Campbell, P. (1999). The service user/survivor movement. In C. Newnes, G Holmes & C. 
Dunn (Eds.), This is madness: A critical look at psychiatry and the future of mental health 
services (pp. 195-209). Ross on Wye: PCCS Books. 
 
Clare, A. (1976). Psychiatry in dissent: Controversial issues in thought and practice. 
London: Tavistock/Routledge. 
 
Davies, B. & Harré, R (1990). Positioning: The discursive production of selves. Journal for 
the Theory of Social Behaviour, 20, 43-63. 
 
ECT Anonymous (1999a).  Newsletter. Summer 1999. Riddlesden: ECT Anonymous. 
 
ECT Anonymous (1999b).  Research information: Don’t believe a word we say about shock 
treatment… Riddlesden: ECT Anonymous.  
 
Edwards, D. & Potter, J. (1992).  Discursive psychology. London: Sage. 
 
Fenichel, O. (1945). The psychoanalytic theory of neurosis. New York: Norton. 
 
Finch, J.M., Sobin, P.B, Carmody, T.J., deWitt, A.P. & Shiwach, R.S. (1999). A survey of 
psychiatrists’ attitudes toward electroconvulsive therapy. Psychiatric Services, 50, 264-265. 
 
Fink, M. (1979). Convulsive therapy: Theory and practice.  Second edition. New York: 
Raven Press. 
 
 28
Freeman, C.P.L. & Kendall, R.E. (1980).  ECT 1:  Patients’ attitudes and experiences.  
British Journal of Psychiatry, 137, 8-16. 
 
Friedberg, J. (1977). Shock treatment, brain damage and memory loss: A neurological 
perspective. American Journal of Psychiatry, 134, 1010-1014. 
 
Gordon, H.L. (1948). Fifty shock therapy theories. Military Surgeon, 103, 397-401. 
 
Griffiths, L. & Hughes, D. (2000).  Talking contracts and talking care:  Managers and 
professionals in the British National Health Service internal market.  Social Science & 
Medicine, 51, 209-222. 
 
Harper, D.J.  (1994).  The professional construction of 'paranoia' and the discursive use of 
diagnostic criteria.   British Journal of Medical Psychology, 67, 131-143.   
 
Harper, D. (1999). Tablet talk and depot discourse: discourse analysis and psychiatric 
medication. In C. Willig (Ed.), Applied discourse analysis: Social and psychological 
interventions (pp. 125-144). Buckingham: Open University Press. 
 
Horton-Salway, M. (2002).  Bio-psycho-social reasoning in GPs' case narratives:  The 
discursive construction of ME patients' identities.  Health:  An Interdisciplinary Journal for 
the Social Study of Health, Illness and Medicine, 6, 401-421. 
 
Janicak, P.G., Mask, J., Trimakas, K.A. & Gibbons, R. (1985). ECT: An assessment of 
mental health professionals’ knowledge and attitudes. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 46, 
262-266. 
 29
 Johnstone, L. (1999).  Adverse psychological effects of ECT.  Journal of Mental Health, 8, 
69-85. 
 
Johnstone, L. (2000). Users and abusers of psychiatry. Second edition.  London: Routledge.  
 
Johnstone, L. (2003).  A shocking treatment?  The Psychologist:  Bulletin of the British 
Psychological Society, 16, 236-239. 
 
Johnstone, L. & Frith, H. (2005).  Discourse analysis and the experience of ECT.  
Psychology & Psychotherapy:  Theory, Research & Practice, 78, 189-203. 
 
Kalayam, B. & Steinhart, M.J. (1981). A survey of attitudes on the use of electroconvulsive 
therapy. Hospital and Community Psychiatry, 45, 298-306. 
 
Levenson, J. & Willett, A. (1982). Milieu reactions to ECT. Psychiatry, 45, 298-306. 
 
Lutchman, R.D., Stevens, T., Bashir, A. & Orrell, M. (2001).  Mental health professionals’ 
attitudes towards and knowledge of electroconvulsive therapy.  Journal of Mental Health, 
10, 141-150. 
 
McElhiney, M.C., Moody, B.J., Steif, B.L., Prudic, J., Devanand, D.P., Nobler, M.S. & 
Sackheim, H.A. (1995).  Autobiographical memory and mood:  Effects of electroconvulsive 
therapy.  Neuropsychology, 9, 501-517. 
 
 30
Medical Research Council, Psychiatric Committee (1965). Clinical trial of the treatment of 
depressive illness. British Medical Journal, 178, 881-886. 
 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence (2003).  Guidance on the use of electroconvulsive 
therapy:  Summary information.  Technology appraisal No. 59.  London:  NICE.  
(www.nice.org.uk/pdf/59ecta4summary.pdf, accessed 14 September 2004). 
 
Neylan, T.C., Canick, J.D., Hall, S.E., Reus, V.I., Sapolsky, R.M. & Wolkowitz, O.M.  
(2001).  Cortisol levels predict cognitive impairment induced by electroconvulsive therapy.  
Biological Psychiatry, 50, 331-336. 
 
Parker, I. (1992).  Discourse dynamics:  Critical analysis for social and individual 
psychology.  London:  Routledge. 
 
Parker, I. (1997). Discursive psychology.  In D.R. Fox & I. Prillitensky (Eds.), Critical 
psychology: An introduction (pp. 284-298). London: Sage. 
 
Parker, I., Georgaca, E, Harper, D., McLaughlin, T & Stowell-Smith, M. (1995). 
Deconstructing psychopathology. London: Sage.  
 
Perkins, R. (1994).  Choosing ECT.  Feminism & Psychology, 4, 621-627. 
 
Pilgrim, D. & Rogers, A. (1993).  A sociology of mental health and illness.  Buckingham:  
Open University Press. 
 
Pippard, J. & Ellam, L. (1981).  ECT in Great Britain.  London:  Gaskell. 
 31
 Potter, J. & Hepburn, A. (2005).  Qualitative interviews in psychology: problems and 
possibilities.  Qualitative Research in Psychology, 2, 281-/307 
 
Potter, J. & Wetherell, M. (1987). Discourse and social psychology: Beyond attitudes and 
behaviour. London: Sage. 
 
Read, J. (2004).  Electroconvulsive therapy.  In J. Read, L.R. Mosher & R.P. Bentall. (Eds.), 
Models of madness:  Psychological, social and biological approaches to schizophrenia (pp. 
85-99).  London:  Brunner-Routledge/ISPS. 
 
Robertson, H. & Pryor, R. (2006).  Memory and cognitive effects of ECT:  Informing and 
assessing patients.  Advances in Psychiatric Treatment, 12, 228-238. 
 
Rose, D., Wykes, T., Leese, M., Bindman, J. & Fleischmann, P. (2003).  Patients’ 
perspectives on electroconvulsive therapy:  Systematic review.  British Medical Journal, 
326, 1363-1367. 
 
Rose, D., Fleischmann, P. & Wykes, T. (2004).  Consumers’ views of electroconvulsive 
therapy:  A qualitative analysis.  Journal of Mental Health, 13, 285-293. 
 
Rosier, M. (1974). Asking silly questions. In N. Armistad (Ed.), Reconstructing social 
psychology (pp. 101-114). Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
 
Royal College of Psychiatrists (1995). The ECT handbook. London: Royal College of 
Psychiatrists. 
 32
 Salford Community Health Council (1998).  Electro-convulsive Therapy, its Use and Effects.  
Salford:  author.  (Available at:  http://www.ect.org/resources/UKreport.html, accessed 9 
August 2006). 
 
Sorenson, J. (1991).  Mass media and discourse on famine in the Horn of Africa.  Discourse 
& Society, 2, 223-242. 
 
Soyland, A.J. (1995).  Analyzing therapeutic and professional discourse.  In J. Siegfried 
(Ed.), Therapeutic and everyday discourse as behavior change:  Towards a micro-analysis 
in psychotherapy process research (pp. 277-300).  Norwood, NJ:  Ablex. 
 
Spiro, H. (1992).  The stigma of electroconvulsive therapy: A workshop.  In P.J. Fink and A. 
Tasman (Eds.), Stigma and mental illness (pp.189-201). Washington: American Psychiatric 
Press 
 
Walkup, J. (1994).  Commentary on Harper, 'the professional construction of paranoia and 
the discursive use of diagnostic criteria'.  British Journal of Medical Psychology,67, 
147-151. 
 
Wayne, G.J. (1955). Some unconscious determinants in physicians motivating the use of 
particular treatment methods – with special reference to electroconvulsive treatment. 
Psychoanalytic Review, 42, 83. 
 
West, E.D. (1981). Electrical stimulation therapy in depression: A double blind controlled 
trial. British Medical Journal, 282, 355-357. 
 
 33
Wetherell, M.  (1998). Positioning and interpretative repertoires:  Conversation analysis and 
post-structuralism in dialogue.  Discourse & Society, 9, 387-413. 
 
Willig, C. (2001).  Introducing qualitative research in psychology.  Buckingham:  Open 
University Press. 
 
Willig, C. (1999). Introduction.  In C. Willig (Ed.), Applied discourse analysis: Social and 
psychological interventions (pp. 1-21). Buckingham: Open University Press. 
 
Wood, L.A. & Kroger, R.O. (2000). Doing discourse analysis: Methods for studying action 
in talk and text. London: Sage. 
 34
 35
Appendix 
 
Transcription notation 
 
Noticeable pauses of less than one second were indicated by a full stop in brackets (.) while 
pauses of between 1 and 3 seconds are indicated by the word ‘pause’. A slash (/) indicates 
interruption and triangular brackets (< and >) indicate incidental contributions that were 
made by speakers during the other speaker’s turn. Transcripts were punctuated to facilitate 
reading. Identifying details were changed to preserve the anonymity of participants. 
